RETHINKING CBRN DEFENCE: Key Takeaways from the JCBRN Defence COE Annual Conference 2025

The JCBRN Defence COE successfully hosted its Annual Conference from 21–23 October 2025 in Brno, Czech Republic. Under the theme “Rethinking CBRN Defence,” the Conference brought together military leaders, policymakers, scientists, legal experts, and practitioners to reassess the future of CBRN defence in a rapidly evolving security environment.

Building on the momentum of previous years, the 2025 Conference confirmed a clear trend of expanding participation and increasing interdisciplinary engagement. Representatives from eighteen NATO Member States and two partner nations gathered alongside experts from a number of NATO bodies, academia, international initiatives, and national armed forces or first responder organisations. Notably, four Ukrainian officers participated in person, representing the Support Forces Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Military Institute of Armored Forces of NTU “KhPI,” reinforcing the Conference’s operational relevance.

Keynotes: Reframing CBRN Defence in a Contested World

Opening the Conference, as representative of the Centre’s Framework Nation, the Director of Strategic Development Department of the Czech Ministry of Defence LtGen (Ret.) Jaromír Alan emphasized the necessity of challenging long-held assumptions and embracing innovation to maintain credible deterrence and defence.

Mr. James Stokes, the Director of Nuclear Policy at NATO HQ International Staff, highlighted that CBRN threats are both local and global. State actors, terrorism, industrial incidents, and disinformation all contribute to a complex risk environment as any military conflict may involve CBRN use. Since 2022, NATO’s CBRN Defence Policy has been reframed as an integral element of the Alliance’s defence posture. However, rapid innovation in chemical and biological research, coupled with open access to knowledge, has increased proliferation risks, reinforcing the need for vigilance, resilience, and adaptation.

Brigadier General Wojciech Ozga, Commander of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC), provided operational insights from the Ukrainian battlefield. He underscored the realities of modern warfare, which include lack of clear air superiority, battlefield transparency driven by drones, contested space and cyber domains, as well as constant threat to civilian infrastructure including nuclear facilities. While NATO has demonstrated strong capacity to identify lessons learned, institutional inertia and varying threat perceptions across the Alliance remain challenges in translating lessons from Ukraine into rapid implementation.

Panel I: Can CBRN Defence Keep Pace with the Digital and AI Revolution?

• Major General Paul Peyton, MSM, CD (NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic - Military Deputy Director for North America)
• Brigadier General Dr. Eng Mariusz Chmielewski (Polish Cyberspace Defence Forces - Deputy Commander)
• Dr. Helene Thorsen Rønning (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment - Research Manager)
• Dr. Andrea Malizia (University of Rome Tor Vergata - Associate Profesor)

The first thematic bloc, chaired by Colonel Mariusz Młynarczyk, PhD, Director of our Transformation Support Department, examined how digital transformation and artificial intelligence are reshaping CBRN defence. Panelists stressed that AI must be understood not as a niche enabler but as a foundational element of military transformation. From decision-support tools and autonomous drones to advanced simulation platforms modeling CBRN crisis scenarios, AI is redefining situational awareness and operational tempo. NATO’s digital transformation requires a cultural shift supported by secure digital backbones, interoperable architectures, and agile software development.

However, the dual-use nature of AI and biotechnology presents serious risks. While AI enhances detection and predictive modeling, it may also enable manipulation of biological data or misuse by state and non-state actors. Ensuring AI literacy across military and civilian institutions, embedding ethical safeguards, and maintaining sovereign control over critical technologies emerged as urgent priorities.

The role of the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) was highlighted as a mechanism to bridge the innovation gap by rapidly connecting emerging technologies with operational requirements, including in the CBRN domain.

Panel II: What Happens When Space, Cyber, and CBRN Defence Converge?

• Mr. John Clements, PMP (U.S. Homeland Defence and Security Information Analysis Center - Technical Lead)
• Mr.  Zachary Kallenborn (King’s College London - PhD Student and Researcher)
• Dr. Gary Sutlieff  (University of Bristol - Researcher)

Colonel Jaroslav Rybák, leading our Operations Support Department, chaired the second block which  addressed the hitherto underexplored integration of CBRN defence into the expanding operational nexus of space and cyberspace.

Space remains a largely unregulated and contested domain. While satellite assets are essential for communication, navigation, and environmental monitoring, they are vulnerable to anti-satellite weapons, jamming, and cyber interference. Participants discussed the opportunities and technical limits of orbital CBRN detection and the need for improved sensors and faster data pipelines that may enable it in the future. While nuclear and radiological hazards are mostly undetectable, detection of chemical hazards are most plausible way ahead.

Underscoring the multidomain nature of CBRN, drones were described as both force multipliers and emerging CBRN delivery risks. AI-assisted swarm tactics, autonomous reconnaissance, and low-cost uncrewed systems complicate both detection and attribution. Lessons from Ukraine demonstrate how drone saturation affects troop movement, evacuation, and contamination response.

A key takeaway was that emerging domains do not replace or diminish traditional pillars CBRN defence, rather they expand and complement it. Interoperability across land, air, maritime, cyber, and space domains is essential to ensure that technological innovation translates into operational readiness.

Panel III: When Law, Ethics, and CBRN Defence Collide

• LtGen (Rtd.) Professor Martin Bricknell CB OStJ  (King’s College London - Professor of Conflict, Health and Military Medicine)
• Major Jonathan W. Neenan, Judge Advocate (U.S. Headquarters Joint Task Force Civil Support - Staff Judge Advocate)
• JUDr. Martin Faix, PhD.  (Centre for International Humanitarian and Operational Law at Palacký University Olomouc - Vice-Dean)
• Ms. Jitka Kranz, MSc, LL.M.  (Legal Researcher)

Legal and ethical dimensions in the unique field of CBRN defence formed the third pillar of the Conference, and were discussed in a panel chaired by the Centre’s Legal Advisor Mr. Zdeněk Hýbl. Panelists examined the complex international legal regime governing nuclear weapons, including frameworks such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and oversight mechanisms like the International Atomic Energy Agency. With bilateral arms control agreements eroding and the future of other arrangements uncertain, renewed dialogue and forward-looking frameworks were deemed critical.

Beyond nuclear governance, participants explored operational legal realities in CBRN response, including authority, liability, and inter-agency coordination. While universal in principle the medical ethics become uniquely complex during CBRN crises, particularly when decisions involve experimental countermeasures or constrained resources. Human and environmental costs of CBRN use, particularly in the nuclear context, cannot be separated from the debates on legal principles and remain deeply impactful.

The overarching conclusion was clear: neither law nor ethics alone can prevent misuse of WMDs. Yet integrating ethical governance into every stage of preparedness is essential for legitimacy, trust, and alignment with the values NATO seeks to defend.

Panel IV: How Do We Modernise CBRN Defence Without Losing Past Lessons?

• Colonel Artmen Vlasiuk (Support Forces Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - Chief of Civil Protection Division of the CBRN Defence Office)
• Lieutenant colonel Anders Kildal (Norwegian Armed Forces CBRN & EP School - Commandant)
• Lieutenant colonel Zachary D. Brainard (U.S. Army CBRN School - Assistant Commandant)
• Lieutenant colonel Alexander Groiss (NATO SHAPE - Staff Officer Strategic Plans)
• Lieutenant colonel Elemír Kurej (NATO SHAPE - Staff Officer CBRN Defence Policy)

The final panel discussion of the Confernece returned to the battlefield and the imperative of modernization. During discussion chaired by Colonel Michael Firmin, the Director of Education, Training and Evaluation Department, speakers emphasized that doctrine must adapt to high-tempo, multi-domain operations shaped by AI, robotics, and hybrid tactics. CBRN defence can no longer function as a standalone specialty and it must be embedded across operational planning and capability development.

Lessons from Ukraine highlighted the use of irritant agents delivered by grenades and UAVs, strikes near nuclear facilities, and the targeting of civilian infrastructure. Hybrid tactics such as disinformation related to “dirty bombs” or radiation incidents demonstrate how psychological and informational dimensions intersect with physical CBRN threats.

Nationwide preparedness and population resilience were repeatedly emphasized, and highlighted through the Nordic “Total Defence” concept. A whole-of-nation approach, integrating civilians, first responders, industry, and military structures, strengthens deterrence and operational endurance. Technology accelerates response, but resilience ultimately depends on trained personnel, informed citizens, and trusted institutions.

Presentations: The Importance of Countering Disinformation and Understanding Public Response

Separate individual presentations by Mr. Trevor Smith (Senior Program Manager and Deputy Director at the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Biological & Chemical Security, CBRN Cross-Cutting Issues) and Dr. Julia Pearce (Reader in Social Psychology & Security Studies at King’s College London addressed two critical cross-cutting issues: WMD-related disinformation and public behaviour during CBRNe incidents.

Disinformation accompanies CBRN crises wherever they emerge. Rather than reactively “chasing” false narratives, deliberate, centralized communication strategies, pre-bunking techniques, and evidence-based updates to decision-makers are the recommended and more impactful approach. Artificial intelligence can both exacerbate and help counter disinformation trends.

Research on public responses to CBRN incidents challenged common assumptions about panic. Evidence suggests cooperation is more common than chaos; however, insufficient response or mistrust can be equally dangerous. Transparent communication and equitable treatment are essential to maintaining public trust during CBRN emergencies.

Takeaway: Compiled Lessons on CBRN Defence on the Ukrainian Battlefield

Throughout the Conference, senior Ukrainian and NATO representatives discussed the lessons from the war in Ukraine, underscoring the practical dimension of how the CBRN defence and threats evolved in the context of real warfare. In addition to earlier insights by Brigadier General Wojciech Ozga of NATO-Ukraine JATEC and Armed Force of Ukraine’s Colonel Artem Vlasiuk, these lessons were expanded also through a separate presentation by two representatives of the Ukrainian Military Institute of Armored Forces of NTU “KhPI, Colonel Serhii Petrukhin (Head of the Chair of Chemistry and Chemical Warfare Agents) and Lieutenant Colonel Oleksii Matykin (Associate Professor of the Chair of CBRN Defense).

CBRN risks have expanded in both method and impact. Irritant agents have reportedly been delivered via grenades and UAVs to force troops from defensive positions. Strikes near nuclear power plants and other CBRN-related facilities risk mass evacuations and disruption of both civilian life and military operations. Even CBRN training institutions have been targeted, affecting preparedness and education.

The saturation of uncrewed systems has transformed the battlefield. Drones increasingly replace missiles in various roles, making troop movements more visible and complicating CBRN medical evacuation. Reports suggest that small, low-cost platforms may also be used to deliver CBRN hazards, lowering the operational threshold and complicating detection.

Beyond the physical domain, CBRN issues are embedded in hybrid warfare. Disinformation about “dirty bombs” or radiation incidents is used to create panic, destabilise politics, and divert resources. Strengthening communication strategies and media literacy has therefore become a key resilience measure.

Ukraine is also expanding reconnaissance and evidence-collection capabilities to document CBRN-related violations of international law, while improving protective equipment and decontamination systems through international cooperation and growing domestic production. Overall, close cooperation with NATO structures, civil authorities, and industry supports a comprehensive approach that enhances national resilience.

What Next?

The 2025 Conference reaffirmed that rethinking CBRN defence is a clear strategic necessity. Current and future battlefields are multi-domain, data-driven, and psychologically contested. Hybrid warfare, disinformation, and societal resilience must be integrated into NATO’s CBRN thinking. To support this goal, the JCBRN Defence COE will complete and disseminate a comprehensive study throughout 2026 focused on NATO’s CBRN defence on the modern battlefield, building on previous research on unmanned systems and emerging technologies. Additionally, the Centre will carry out dedicated research into the intersection of CBRN defence with space and cyberspace, with findings expected later this year.

As technological acceleration and geopolitical instability continue to reshape the security environment, the JCBRN Defence COE remains committed to fostering innovation, strengthening interoperability, and ensuring that NATO and its partners remain resilient against evolving CBRN threats. Rethinking CBRN Defence is not about abandoning established principles. On the contrary, the real world threats and return of high-intensity conventional warfare underscores the need to rediscover foundational principles while adapting established approaches to a future where speed, integration, trust, and resilience will determine strategic success.

Photo: JCBRN Defence COE Archive